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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) was created
to provide civil rights protections to individuals with disabilities.2 Its goal
was “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”3 At its
incorporation into law, Congress estimated that over forty-three million
Americans suffered from some form of mental or physical disability.4 As
such, the ADA was to guarantee these Americans equal opportunity in
“public accommodations, employment, transportation, State and local
government services, and telecommunications.”5 In fact, its protections
were designed to mirror those previously granted to individuals based on
sex, color, race, age, national origin, and religion.6 As a result, the ADA has
been called the most significant civil rights legislation enacted since the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.7
The ADA had a particularly expansive impact in regard to disability
discrimination in employment practices.8 In fact, the ADA applies to all
companies that employ over fifteen people and covers nearly all aspects of
employment.9 Yet, despite its broad coverage, it has left unclear how shortterm disabilities will be included under these protections.10 For instance,
should a person who suffers an injury be covered if the injury only lasts one
or two months? What about a year? Or, what if the impairment is
extremely mild but lasts for a long time, or is extremely severe but lasts for
only a few weeks? Considerations of duration and severity have not been
fully addressed under the ADA.11 This is true despite the new language
2

Americans with Disabilities Act Questions and Answers, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N &
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ada.gov/q&aeng02.htm (last updated Nov. 14,
2008) [hereinafter ADA Questions and Answers].
3
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 329
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 12101(b)(1) (2006)).
4
Id. § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 328.
5
ADA Questions and Answers, supra note 2. The ADA covers a wide variety of subject matter,
including employment, transportation, public accommodations, and services operated by both public and
private entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17, 131–34, 141–50, 161–65, 181–89 (2006) (Titles I, II, and III of
the ADA as codified in the United States Code).
6
ADA Questions and Answers, supra note 2.
7
Americans with Disabilities Act and ADA Civil Rights Summary, AFFIRM ABLE ACTION
ASSOCIATES, http://www.disability-access.org/ada.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
8
See generally A Guide to Disability Rights Law, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.pdf (providing an overview of the major disability
rights legislation in effect). While the Rehabilitative Act of 1964 prohibited disability discrimination in
federal employment, federal contracts, or against those receiving Federal financial assistance, the ADA
expands such anti-discriminatory policies to the private employment sector. Compare id. at 1, with 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (2006).
9
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) (2006). Employment practices include job application procedures,
hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. Id. § 12112(a). Other practices include recruitment, advertising, tenure, layoff, leave,
fringe benefits, and all other employment-related activities. ADA Questions and Answers, supra note 2.
10
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The ADA does not specifically identify all disabilities included
under the Act. Id.
11
Id.
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added to the ADA under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), requiring transitory impairments (lasting less than
six months) to be excluded from certain protections.12 Should this exclusion
be limited to one portion of the ADA’s extensive definition of disability, or
expanded to exclude short-term disabilities from the entire Act? And, what
exactly does this exclusion cover?
This Comment will explore the relationship between short-term
disabilities and the ADA as it was amended by the ADAAA. It will discuss
how short-term disabilities under the ADA should be treated in light of the
ADAAA’s purpose and statutory structure. Particularly, this Comment
addresses whether the exclusion of short-term disabilities should be limited
to a particular portion of the statute or included throughout the whole.
Furthermore, this Comment investigates the exact types of short-term
disabilities that will even qualify under the statute. Considering the
statutory structure, congressional intent, and the purpose of the ADAAA,
this Comment argues for the limitation of the short-term disability exclusion
to the “regarded as” prong of the statute.13 This Comment also attempts to
define short-term disabilities under the new statutory language, arguing that
only impairments that are both transitory and minor should be excluded
(rather than also excluding impairments that are only one or the other).
Finally, this Comment attempts to define what constitutes a “minor”
impairment under the exception in light of the ADA’s failure to clearly
address this term.
Section II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the
protections afforded persons with disabilities over the last few decades and
how short-term disabilities have fit into those protections. This section will
describe the definition of “disability” under the ADA and specifically look
at the “actual” and “regarded as” prongs under the definition. This section
will then analyze how short-term disabilities have been treated under the
ADA, and discuss the limitations the United States Supreme Court has
placed on the statute since its enactment. A brief overview of the changes
brought by the ADAAA will be provided, along with an examination of how
they have affected short-term disabilities under the ADA. Next, this section
will discuss particular portions of the ADAAA that stand to limit or expand
coverage of short-term disabilities under the ADA. Particularly, this section
will examine concerns over the inclusion of the “transitory and minor”
exception to coverage under the “regarded as” prong of disability and the
12
Id.; ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555. The ADA was
amended in 2008 in an effort by Congress to provide more clarity to the language of the ADA and restore
Congress’s original intent for the protections under the ADA. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat.
at 3553.
13
The ADA defines “disability” in terms of three alternative definitions or prongs, intended to
cover different scenarios in which disability discrimination may occur. See infra Part II.A. The three
prongs of the definition are “actual,” “record of,” and “regarded as.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
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effect this language has on both the “regarded as” prong and the statute as a
whole. Finally, this section will describe the extent to which the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has addressed these
issues.14
Section III of this Comment will analyze the issues regarding shortterm disabilities and the ADA, focusing on: (1) ambiguity in the scope of
the “transitory and minor” exception within the statute; (2) questions
concerning the coverage of the exception; and (3) the need for definitions.
This section will discuss the application of the “transitory and minor”
exception within the statutory scheme, assessing the arguments regarding
whether the exception should extend to the entire statute or be restricted
solely to the “regarded as” prong. This section will then analyze the
coverage of the exception in light of the EEOC’s newly adopted position,
which only excludes impairments that are both transitory and minor.
Finally, this section considers the appropriate definition of what constitutes
a “minor” disability under the exception, acknowledging a need for a
standardized definition.
Section IV of this Comment offers a solution to the three major
difficulties facing short-term disabilities. First, considering the statutory
structure, Congressional intent, and the purpose of the ADAAA, this section
will argue that the “transitory and minor” exception should be limited to the
“regarded as” prong. Second, this section will argue to exclude only those
disabilities that are both transitory and minor, while including either solely
transitory or solely minor disabilities under ADA coverage. These
arguments are again made considering statutory structure, Congressional
intent, and the purpose of the ADAAA. Finally, this section will argue that
the term “minor” under the ADA should be defined narrowly, excluding
only those impairments synonymous to a hangnail, common cold, sprained
joint, or stomach ache. This argument considers rules of statutory
interpretation and Congressional intent.
II.

BACKGROUND

Despite the lofty goals of the ADA, its reach in ending disability
discrimination in employment has not always been as expansive as initially
intended.15 Many identified the ADA as a mere regulatory issue affecting
private businesses, rather than a civil rights issue, emphasizing the costs to
society and the potential for abuse.16 In fact, the majority of the early
14
The ADA names the EEOC as the administrative agency delegated with the authority to
implement, enforce, and promulgate rules under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
15
See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1810–20 (2005) (discussing the failures of the ADA in light of poor employment
statistics of people with disabilities following the ADA and low litigation success rates under Title I).
16
Janine Jackson, A Right, Not a Favor: Coverage of Disability Act Misses Historical Shift, FAIR:
FAIRNESS & ACCURACY IN REPORTING (Dec. 2000), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1048 (citing
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scholarly writing focused on problems presented by Title I of the ADA,
which covers employment discrimination and accommodation on the basis
of disability.17 Most scholars took issue with the inappropriate narrowing of
the interpretation of the ADA, particularly in terms of coverage under the
definition of disability.18 While the ADAAA took steps to broaden the
amount of disabilities included under the statute, it has still left unclear the
degree to which short-term or minor impairments are included.
The evolution of short-term disabilities under the ADA has been
viewed skeptically, especially considering how these disabilities have been
granted (or denied) coverage in light of ADA’s definition of disability.
Despite the broad definition of disability under the Act, short-term
disabilities were initially excluded as a result of judicial interpretation
narrowing the scope of the ADA.19 While Congress attempted to
reintroduce short-term disabilities to coverage under the ADAAA, the
overall effect has been unclear.20 Under the ADA, short-term disabilities
have been specifically addressed in conjunction with minor impairments,
and thus, the true nature of how they will be included has yet to be
decided.21
A. “Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA defines “disability” using three prongs, where an
individual is deemed to have a disability if they: (1) show an actual physical
or mental impairment (“actual”); (2) have a record of such an impairment
(“record of”); or (3) show that they have been regarded as having such an
various news outlets, such as the Chicago Tribune and USA Today, which highlighted the cost burden to
employers of adding wheelchair ramps and accommodations for the disabled). While there are articles
that celebrate the effect of the ADA, costs and abuse are the constant themes concerning the statute. Id.;
see also, Steve Chapman, The Other Side of the Disabled-Rights Law, CHI. TRIB., July 30, 2000, at 15
(the ADA “forces employers to provide handicapped workers with the accommodations they need to do a
job--and it sets no dollar limit on the obligation . . . . Just installing a ramp for a wheelchair . . . can run as
high as $10,000.”); Christopher J. Willis, Comment, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Disabling the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 772–30 (1994) (highlighting the costs of the ADA to
employers as a major failure of the ADA).
17
Waterstone, supra note 15, at 1811–14.
18
Id. at 1813–18; see also, Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 536–68 (1997) (addressing various judicial misconstructions of the
ADA’s definition of disability). Issues with the narrowing in the interpretation of the ADA were
mimicked by administrative agencies (the EEOC and the Department of Justice) that had to enforce the
statute, which complained that such interpretation made it harder to enforce the ADA. Waterstone, supra
note 15, at 1815–16 (citing Nat’l Council on Disability, The Americans with Disabilities Act Policy Brief
Series: Righting the ADA, No. 7, The Impact of the Supreme Court’s ADA Decisions on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities 16 (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2003/
February252003 (follow “The Impact of the Supreme Court’s ADA Decisions on the Rights of Persons
With Disabilities” hyperlink)).
19
Burgdorf, supra note 18, at 482; see also id. at 482–88 (1997) (providing a survey of circuit court
cases that served to exclude short-term disabilities under the ADA); infra Part II.B.
20
See infra Part II.C.
21
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2006) (“ . . . shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and
minor.”).
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impairment (“regarded as”).22 The “actual” prong of the definition refers to
any disability that “substantially limits one or more [of the] major life
activities of such individual.”23 Meanwhile, “major life activities” include
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, reading, and working, to name a few.24 Following the ADAAA,
the “substantially limits” requirement only applies to the “actual” and
“record of” prongs of disability.25 Meanwhile, the “regarded as” prong
allows for an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment to be
included as a disability regardless of whether or not the impairment limits
(or is perceived to limit) a major life activity.26 Together, the “actual” and
“regarded as” prongs account for the clear majority of disability cases.27 In
fact, the “record of” prong has largely been ignored in practice and its
function has been limited under the ADA.28 Accordingly, this Comment
focuses its discussion on the “actual” and “regarded as” prongs of disability
and how they have affected the inclusion of short-term disabilities under the
ADA.
B. Pre-Amendment “Disability”: Judicial Exclusion of Short-Term
Disabilities
While the ADA was originally intended to provide clear, consistent,
and enforceable standards in combating discrimination, many issues arose
that served to limit the reach of “disability” under the statute.29 Prior to the
ADAAA, the “substantially limits” criterion, which is currently limited to
the first two prongs of disability, also applied to the “regarded as” prong of
22
Id. § 12102(1). This three-part definition was designed to reflect the specific types of
discrimination that disabled individuals experience, with the “actual” prong focusing on the disability of
the individual and the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs focusing on the reactions of the employer.
Arlene Mayerson, Disability Rights Law: Roots, Present Challenges, and Future Collaboration, 41
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 265, 268 (2007), http://www.dredf.org/publications/DisRightsLawRootsPresentChallenges_10_07.pdf. Accordingly, it is significantly broader than the definition of
disability given in other statutes. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), with 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)
(defining “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months”); see also
Index of State and Federal Statutory Interpretations of Disability, GEORGETOWN LAW,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada/documents/statebystatechart--updated.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2011) (providing an index of statutory definitions of disability by jurisdiction, along with comments
and current case law).
23
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
24
Id. § 12102(2)(A).
25
See id. §§ 12102(1), 12102(3)(A) (specifying that an impairment may fall under the “regarded as”
prong “whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity”). This was not
how the Supreme Court initially interpreted the statute. See infra Part II.B.
26
Id. § 12102(3)(A).
27
Alex B. Long, (Whatever Happened to) the ADA’s “Record of” Prong(?), 81 WASH. L. REV.
669, 674–76 (2006). According to one survey between the years 2000–2005, disputes about a plaintiff’s
eligibility under the “actual” or “regarded as” prongs were more than three times more common at the
appellate level than under the “record of” prong. Id. at 673–74.
28
See id. at 674–76 (discussing the underutilization of the “record of” prong in practice).
29
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(2), 104 Stat. 327, 329
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2006)).
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the Act.30 Specifically, a person was regarded as disabled if an employer
mistakenly believed that the person’s actual, non-limiting impairment
substantially limited them in a major life activity.31 In fact, under the
original interpretation of the ADA, all the prongs under disability used the
term “impairment” as it was defined under the “actual” prong.32
Accordingly, the Supreme Court consistently narrowed ADA
coverage through its interpretations of the “substantially limiting” criterion
under the “actual” prong.33 For instance, in its case of first impression on
the issue, the Court interpreted “substantially limiting” to require that, at a
minimum, plaintiffs must allege that their impairment prohibited them from
working in a broad class of jobs.34 A few years later, the Court furthered
this restrictive interpretation, specifically excluding all but the most severe
injuries and short-term disabilities.35 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing of
Kentucky v. Williams, the Court held that to be considered substantially
limiting, an impairment must prevent or severely restrict an individual from
doing activities that were central in importance to most people’s daily
lives.36 More importantly, the Court required the impairment be either
permanent or at least long-term to qualify.37 Naturally, these holdings had a
negative impact on the inclusion of short-term disabilities under the ADA.38
In fact, the Court seemed to champion this effect, stating that its goal was to
ensure that the ADA was strictly interpreted to create “a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled.”39
The truly restrictive effect of the Court’s interpretations on shortterm disabilities became apparent as federal courts routinely held that
temporary medical conditions were not included under the definition of
30

See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999).
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521–22 (1999).
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3(2), 104 Stat. at 329–30. “Such an impairment,”
as used under the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs, refers to impairment as defined under the
preceding “actual” prong. Id.
33
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490–91 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
198 (2002). This judicial narrowing has often been referenced in terms of a judicial backlash against
what the Supreme Court considered the overly broad coverage of the ADA. See Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s resistance in terms of its failure to grasp or accept the true civil rights aspect of the
ADA); see also Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to
Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993,
1001–05 (2010) (providing an overview of the judicial backlash and the scholarly writing concerning the
topic). But see Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court
Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 547–61 (2008)
(discussing the limits of the judicial backlash theory in favor of predictability as a result of the statutory
directive and governing social norms).
34
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
35
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See infra note 46 (asserting impairments of short duration clearly would not qualify—and indeed
did not qualify—under the “permanent” or “long-term” requirements).
39
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
31
32
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disability.40 In federal courts, short-term disabilities were excluded from
both the “actual” and “regarded as” prongs of the disability.41 Such
exclusions are best reflected in McIntosh v. Brookdale Hospital Medical
Center, where a plaintiff nurse, claiming that a hospital wrongfully
terminated her employment due to her hypertension, was denied action as a
result of the short duration of her ailment.42 The court held that a reasonable
jury could not conclude that the plaintiff had more than a transitory
impairment because the hypertension only lasted for a month.43 Similarly,
the court held that there was no indication that the employer regarded her
condition as being anything more than transitory in nature.44 Thus, the
plaintiff had no claim under the “actual” or “regarded as” prongs of
disability, since the condition could not have substantially limited her ability
to work.45
Under similar federal cases, short-term disabilities were defined as
disabilities that lasted a few months at the most.46 In fact, one court
indicated that that the decisive weight of authority had held that an
impairment lasting for a period of one month, and not expected to recur, did
not constitute a disability under the ADA.47 Similar interpretations were
taken by the state courts, which followed the federal judicial precedent of
excluding short-term disabilities.48 For instance, in Chatmon v. North
40
Atkins v. USF Dugan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (“[A] disabling, but
transitory, physical or mental condition will not trigger the protections of the ADA.”) (internal quotations
omitted); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 199 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Baird ex rel.
Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Based on the aforementioned factors, it is evident that the
term ‘disability’ does not include temporary medical conditions.”); McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The Rehabilitation Act and the Disabilities Act do not apply to
the transient, nonpermanent condition that [the plaintiff] experienced.”); see Burgdorf, supra note 18, at
536–68 (addressing various other federal circuit cases narrowing the ADA’s definition of disability to
exclude short-term disabilities); see also Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the Americans
with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419, 450–51 (2011) (summarizing the
limitations that duration brought to ADA coverage).
41
E.g., McIntosh v. Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 942 F. Supp. 813, 820–21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d,
125 F.3d 844 (2d Cir. 1997).
42
McIntosh, 942 F. Supp. at 815 (finding that the plaintiff’s hypertension only lasted for a month
and the plaintiff provided no indication that it would reoccur in the future).
43
Id. at 821.
44
Id. at 821–22.
45
Id.
46
David K. Fram, The ADA Amendments Act: Dramatic Changes in Coverage, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 193, 211 (2008); see also Atkins v. USF Dugan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804–05 (M.D.N.C.
1999) (holding that inability to work for less than three months due to heart disease, diabetes, and
hypertension did not constitute a disability); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 200 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that a back injury lasting two months was not a disability); Sanders v. Arneson Prods.,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment lasting three
and a half months was not sufficient to constitute a disability); McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
62 F.3d 92, 95–96 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the inability to work for two months following abdominal
surgery was not a disability).
47
McIntosh, 942 F. Supp. at 820.
48
See Chatmon v. N. C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 622 S.E.2d 684 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005),
overruled by Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96 (2010); see also Hallgren v. Integrated Fin.
Corp., 679 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that a disability lasting a month was too
transient to be considered a disability under the ADA).
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Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, a benefits recipient
argued that her benefits were improperly reduced after she was unable to
fulfill her required service hours due to diabetes.49 Following the guidance
of the federal courts, the court held that a “disabling, but transitory, physical
or mental condition will not trigger the protections of the ADA.”50
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act
As evidenced above, under the original scheme of the ADA, shortterm disabilities were nearly eliminated from eligibility as a result of judicial
interpretation. Such interpretations seemed contrary to the broad sweeping
findings and intentions established in the original ADA.51 As a result of the
Supreme Court’s restrictions, Congress decided to amend the ADA in
2008.52 On September 25, 2008, the ADAAA was signed into law with the
intention of clarifying and reiterating who is covered by the ADA’s
protections.53 This included a reversal of many of the Supreme Court’s
limiting decisions and a return to the broad scope and protections available
under the statute.54
D. Redefining “Disability”: Short-Term Disabilities Under the ADAAA
The ADAAA attempted to address many issues relating to the
definition of disability, which was arguably the ADA’s biggest limitation at
the time.55 The ADAAA made several changes to the definition, including a
reduction of the demanding eligibility standards, a broadening of the
“substantially limits” coverage, and an expansion of the major life activities
encompassed under the “actual” prong of disability.56 However, the most
pertinent changes affecting short-term disabilities were those made to the
“regarded as” prong. As mentioned above, the ADAAA eliminated the
“substantially limits” requirement under the “regarded as” prong in favor of
49

Chatmon, 622 S.E.2d at 686–87.
Id. at 690 (quoting Atkins v. USF Dugan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (M.D.N.C. 1999)).
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 327,
328–29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)).
52
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1)(3)–(8),122 Stat. 3553, 3553–
54 (finding the need to overturn the previous findings of the United States Supreme Court in favor of
broader coverage).
53
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, UNITED STATES ACCESS BOARD, http://www.accessboard.gov/about/laws/ada-amendments.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). In fact, the express purpose of
the ADAAA was to restore the intent and protections of the original ADA. ADA Amendments Act of
2008, 122 Stat. at 3553.
54
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(1)–(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
55
Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 218 (2008).
56
See id. (thoroughly assessing the changes made by the ADAAA and their implications). Many
scholarly writers have tracked the changes made by the ADAAA. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 33, at
1013–20; see also Fram, supra note 46, at 194. For actual text showing the changes made by the
ADAAA (with deleted language shown as strike through font, and new language in bold) see Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, As Amended, http://www.ada.gov/pubs/adastatute08mark.htm (last updated
June 15, 2009).
50
51
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merely requiring that a plaintiff prove that the employer perceived an
impairment existed.57 Furthermore, and most importantly, the ADAAA
excluded any injuries considered to be “transitory and minor” under the
“regarded as” prong.58 This language has the greatest potential for limiting
the inclusion of short-term disabilities under the Act.
While the ADAAA states a purpose of eliminating the
inappropriately high limitations placed on the definition of disability, it does
not go as far as describing how transitory and minor disabilities should be
covered under the “actual” or “record of” prongs.59 While the “transitory
and minor” exception is not found in the “actual” or “record of” prongs,60
the ADA does not restrict or negate the use of such criteria when
determining if a disability is eligible under these prongs.61 Thus, while the
ADAAA appears to have overturned the Supreme Court’s requirement that
impairments be permanent or long term,62 it does not expressly allow for
short-term disabilities to be included in the “actual” or “record of” prongs.63
E. Unresolved Issues Regarding Short-Term Disabilities
While the enactment of the ADAAA intended to rectify the
narrowness of the Court’s definition of disability, the inclusion of the
“transitory and minor” exception left many ambiguities and issues to be
addressed regarding short-term disabilities.64 In fact, concern over the
implementation of the “transitory and minor” language originated well
before the ADAAA was even passed.65 For example, one concern, cited by
the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”),66 was that because the
ADAAA did not explicitly apply the “transitory and minor” exception to the
general definition of disability, it “could lead to an unintended and

57
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4, § 3(3)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)
(2006) (providing the current language as amended).
58
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4, § 3(3)(B), 122 Stat. at 3555.
59
Id. § 2(B)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. at 3554; Id. sec. 4, § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555.
60
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
61
Id.
62
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
63
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4, § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555.
64
See, e.g., The ADA Amendments Act: An Overview and Analysis, COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER
EDUC., 3 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.clhe.org/clhe/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/eiada2008.pdf
[hereinafter COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC.]. For a thorough analysis of the perceived shortcomings
of the ADAAA in general, see Kate S. Arduini, Why the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act Is Destined to Fail: Lack of Protection for the “Truly” Disabled, Impracticability of Employer
Compliance, and the Negative Impact It Will Have on Our Already Struggling Economy, 2 DREXEL L.
REV. 161, 180–89 (2009).
65
COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC., supra note 64, at 3.
66
The Office of Management and Budget is the largest component of the Executive Office of the
President, and is responsible for creating the budget and overseeing the management of all executive
agencies. The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ organization_mission/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
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undesirable interpretation of the definition.”67 Specifically, it could mean
that some transitory and minor impairments would be covered as “actual”
disabilities.68 It was also unclear how the “transitory and minor” exception
would mesh with the regulation guidelines provided by the EEOC, which
applied a factor test for determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in major life activities.69 This test considers the nature and severity
of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and
the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.70 Allowing transitory and minor
conditions would essentially undermine all three of the factors it considers;
however, applying the rigid standard would make these factors essentially
unnecessary.
Another concern that has arisen in relation to the “transitory and
minor” exception is that it is ambiguous about what disabilities qualify
under the exception.71 Under the express language of the ADAAA, only
disabilities that are both transitory and minor are excluded from the
“regarded as” prong.72 This would essentially leave those impairments that
are one or the other covered under the prong.73 Concern over this issue was
again noted by the OMB, indicating that the ADAAA should exclude
impairments that are either transitory or minor, since strictly requiring both
had the potential of extending coverage to a mild seasonal allergy or a short
but severe bout with the flu.74 Nevertheless, it is possible for a plaintiff to
argue under the ADA that an ailment that is really bad and lasts for two
weeks should be qualified under the “regarded as” prong.75 Such an
interpretation would not be an oversight.76 Instead, this interpretation is said
to be something disability rights groups wanted to include in the ADAAA
and won.77
Finally, there is uncertainty concerning how to define the term
“minor” under the “transitory and minor” exception.78 The ADAAA (and
67
COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC., supra note 64, at 3 (quoting Statement of Administration
Policy: H.R. 3195, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (June 24, 2008),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77541#axzz1kInByq7L).
68
Id.
69
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195–96 (2002).
70
See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)–(iii) (2001)).
71
See, e.g., Befort, supra note 33, at 1027 (identifying the potential problems involved in the
application of the “transitory and minor” exception).
72
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)).
73
Id.
74
COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC., supra note 64, at 3.
75
Michael O’Brien & Melissa Turley, ADA Amendments Act Passes, HUMAN RES. EXEC. ONLINE
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://hre.lrp.com/HRE/story.jsp?storyId=142318897 (quoting David Fram, National
Employment Law Institutes ADA Expert); see also Befort, supra note 33, at 1028 n.247 (citing other
instances where a court has been willing to twist interpretation of statutory text between “or” and “and”).
76
O’Brien & Turley, supra note 75.
77
Id.
78
COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC., supra note 64, at 3; Befort, supra note 33, at 1027.
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now the ADA) expressly defines “transitory” to mean impairments that have
an actual or expected duration of six months or less.79 However, both the
ADAAA and ADA are silent concerning the definition of “minor.”80 While
it is possible that minor injuries could be determined in light of the
substantially limiting requirement, the ADA makes no connection between
the two definitions.81 Thus, even when a disability is long-term in nature, it
is unclear what would constitute a disability severe enough to avoid the
“transitory and minor” exception.
The implications of these concerns on short-term disabilities are still
unclear, especially considering that the ADAAA only recently became
effective on January 1, 2009.82 At least one federal court has applied the
“transitory and minor” exception under the ADA, though it provides little
guidance or indication of how courts are likely to rule in regard to these
concerns.83 In Emmons v. City University of New York, the plaintiff became
sick and was placed on disability for a one-week period, and was later
injured in a car accident and placed on indefinite disability until about two
months later.84 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim, holding that
the plaintiff’s injuries failed under the “regarded as” prong because they
were both transitory (lasting less than three months) and minor (the
employer did not perceive the plaintiff’s injuries as more than “minor” and
believed the plaintiff was simply at home relaxing).85 Thus, aside from
providing an example of a transitory and minor impairment, typically none
of the actual issues discussed are formally addressed.86 Nevertheless, it is
expected that these ambiguities in interpretation, combined with the
intended broad coverage of the ADAAA, will mean an increase in lawsuits
while at the same time making it harder for employers to defend against a
growing number of disability claims.87

79
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4, § 3(3)(B), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2006)).
80
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. at 3553; 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
81
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
82
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 8, 122 Stat. at 3557 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
705).
83
See Emmons v. City Univ. of New York, 715 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), modified (July 2,
2010).
84
Emmons, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 403–04.
85
Id. at 409.
86
See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Valley Health Sys., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310–311 (W.D. Va.
2011). Recently, one court has mentioned that the issue of whether an impairment is “both transitory and
minor” is one for the jury to decide. Id. at 311 (refusing to hold that both transitory and minor are
required, or expounding on the issue, but providing some indication of how a court will likely hold on the
issue).
87
Frank C. Morris, Jr., Dealing with Workplace Disabilities, SR037 ALI-ABA 557, 611 (2010).
But see Michael O’Brien & Melissa Turley, supra note 75 (citing Lawrence Lorber, a partner with
Proskauer Rose in Washington and counsel to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce who was heavily involved
in the drafting of the ADAAA, as stating that he does not envision a significant or long-lasting increase
in the number of lawsuits filed as a result of the ADAAA, because most companies already have broad
disability policies in place).
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F. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Position
Under the ADA, the EEOC is given authority to implement and
enforce all provisions preventing employment discrimination under Title I
of the statute.88 Accordingly, courts have often looked to the EEOC when
considering how to interpret “disability” under the act.89 In response to the
concerns over the implementation and scope of the “transitory and minor”
exception, the EEOC took a formal position in September 2009, when it
proposed several rules regarding the interpretation of the ADA following the
ADAAA.90 After considering public opinion on these regulations, the
EEOC adopted and published its final version on March 25, 2011.91 In these
regulations, the EEOC expressly states that the “transitory and minor”
exception does not apply to the definition of disability under the “actual” or
“record of” prongs.92 Accordingly, it is clear that the EEOC believes the
“transitory and minor” exception should be limited as a defense to claims
under the “regarded as” prong.93 The EEOC has also taken a position on
what disabilities are excluded under the exception itself. Specifically, the
EEOC states that in order to be excluded under the “transitory and minor”

88

42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). The EEOC is the federal government’s only agency with the sole
focus of eradicating employment discrimination. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and
Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation,
1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 53 (1995).
89
See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490–94 (1999) (using the EEOC
guidelines for substantially limiting to decide that poor eyesight is not a “substantially limiting”
impairment under the ADA).
90
See Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a government agency is required to notify the public
of any changes made to its regulations and provide the public with an opportunity to comment on them.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–57 (2006). For more information on the EEOC’s regulations and its authority to
promulgate them, see EEOC, Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=200910&RIN=3046-AA85 (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
91
See Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630) (publishing and explaining the changes made to the EEOC’s regulations under the ADAAA). The
Notice of Final Rulemaking describes the process by which the EEOC regulations were made, including
any changes between the proposed and final regulations, providing the EEOC’s reasons behind the
change. See id. The final regulations are codified as amended throughout part 1630 of title 29 of the
Code of Federal Rules. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2011). While substantially similar to the proposed
regulations, there were some alterations after public comment. Regulations To Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,981.
The EEOC accepted over six hundred public submissions as well held several town hall meetings to
determine public concern or support for the regulations. Id. at 16,979; see also id. at 16,987 n.1
(describing the EEOC’s public comment process).
92
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
93
Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. at 17,011. The EEOC acknowledged this position by explaining: “The
regulations include a clear statement that the definition of an impairment as transitory . . . only applies to
the ‘regarded as’ (third) prong of the definition of ‘disability’ as part of the ‘transitory and minor’
defense to ‘regarded as’ coverage.” Id.
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exception, the impairment has to be “both ‘transitory and minor.’”94 In
support of these interpretations, the EEOC has provided an appendix to its
final regulations, which had limited legislative support.95 However, these
interpretive guidelines focus primarily on the purpose and scope of the
“regarded as” prong itself, rather than specific interpretation of the
“transitory and minor” exception.96 While these interpretive guidelines
provide an excellent starting point for interpretation, they do not provide
enough specificity and depth to conclusively address concerns regarding
judicial interpretation of the exception.97
Further, the EEOC has not expressly taken a position on how to
define the term “minor.”98 Originally, the EEOC had included examples of
impairments to guide interpretations of transitory and minor:
Example 1: An individual who is not hired for a data entry
position because he will be unable to type for three weeks
due to a sprained wrist is not regarded as disabled, because
a sprained wrist is transitory and minor.
Example 2: An individual who is placed on involuntary
leave because of a broken leg that is expected to heal
normally is not regarded as disabled, because the broken leg
is transitory and minor.
Example 3: An individual who is not hired for an assembly
line job by an employer who believes she has carpal tunnel
syndrome would be regarded as disabled, because carpal
tunnel syndrome is not transitory and minor.
Example 4: An individual who is fired from a food service
job because the employer believes he has Hepatitis C is
regarded as disabled, because Hepatitis C is not transitory
and minor.
Example 5: An individual who is terminated because an
employer believes that symptoms attributable to a mild
intestinal virus are actually symptoms of heart disease is
regarded as disabled, because heart disease--the impairment
94
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (“impairment is both ‘transitory’
and ‘minor’”). The EEOC maintained this position from its proposed rule, where it originally stated that
an impairment must be “both transitory and minor.” Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,449 (emphasis in
original).
95
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
96
See id. (providing only a cursory interpretation of the exception at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. secs.
1630.2(j)(1)(ix)), 1630.2(l).
97
See, e.g., Befort, supra note 33, at 1027 (voicing concerns despite acknowledging the EEOC’s
interpretive guidelines).
98
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (lacking any clear definition of the term).
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the employer believes the individual has--is not transitory
and minor.99
While these examples include impairments that may be considered
minor, i.e. a sprained wrist or broken leg, the problem (one that was not
addressed in the final regulations) is that they do not provide enough
guidance on interpreting what impairments are solely transitory or minor.100
In fact, all of the examples of impairments that would be considered
transitory and minor do not identify whether the impairment failed because
it was not transitory or because it would not be considered minor. The
EEOC had also considered implementing a list of ailments that usually do
not count as disabilities in its proposed regulations, including the common
cold, seasonal influenza, a sprained joint, minor and non-chronic
gastrointestinal disorders, or a broken bone expected to heal completely.101
However, while this list would have provided some guidance for what may
be considered a “minor” impairment, it is important to note that the general
exclusion of these impairments would only have applied to disabilities under
the “actual” and “record of” prongs.102 In fact, under the proposed
regulations, similar impairments may still have qualified under the
“regarded as” prong. Meanwhile, the final regulations are equally cryptic,
offering the example of “a minor back injury” as the type of injury that
would be considered “minor.”103 As such, there still remains no conclusive
definition or guidance to date.104
Under the ADA, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is authorized to
file lawsuits in federal court to enforce the statute, and courts have been
given the authority to order compensatory damages and back pay to remedy
discrimination if the DOJ prevails.105 Despite the EEOC’s interpretations of
the ADAAA, courts will not necessarily be bound to follow them.106
Further, the Supreme Court has already shown its willingness to reject the

99
Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,443.
100
Id.; see, e.g., Transcript of US Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n and Dep’t of Justice Civil
Rights Div. Town Hall Listening Session on the ADAAA Proposed Regulations, in Oakland, Cal., at 45
(Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0122
(asking for more clarity on the exception); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
101
Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,443.
102
Id. at 48,441 (“[T]hese impairments . . . will consistently result in a determination that the person
is substantially limited in a major life activity.”); id. at 48,443 (“[These impairments] usually will not
substantially limit a major life activity.”).
103
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.15(f) (emphasis added).
104
See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (“Definitions” section promulgated by the EEOC lacks any
formal definition for “minor”).
105
ADA Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ada.gov/enforce.htm (last updated Dec. 8,
2011).
106
The United States Supreme Court has neither directly incorporated any of the EEOC’s proposed
positions, nor formally addressed the new language under the “regarded as” prong to date. See generally
Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532 (2000).
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EEOC’s interpretative guidance in deciding cases involving the ADA.107 In
fact, the Court has specifically stated that the EEOC guidelines generally are
“not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority.”108 However,
the Court has also conceded that the regulations “do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”109 Nevertheless, while the Court has
historically referenced the EEOC guidelines in defining “disability” under
the ADA, it has been extremely reluctant to grant them much validity.110
Since the scope of the “transitory and minor” exception and the types of
disabilities it excludes have yet to be determined, these issues must be
analyzed so that they can be addressed in the most compelling and practical
manner.111
II. ANALYSIS
As a result of the ambiguities regarding the “transitory and minor”
exception, the future of short-term disabilities under the ADA is unclear.
Depending on judicial interpretation, the ADA as amended could be just as
restricting to short-term disabilities as the original statute. In light of these
observations and the uncertainty that accompanies judicial acceptance of the
EEOC’s guidelines, the following issues must be addressed: (1) ambiguity
in the scope of the “transitory and minor” exception within the ADA; (2)
questions concerning the coverage of the exception; and (3) the need for an
adequate definition of minor impairments.
A. The Scope of the “Transitory and Minor” Exception within the ADA
The broadest consideration regarding how the “transitory and
minor” exception will affect short-term disabilities is how (or if) it will be
applied throughout the statute.112 Of the three ambiguities, most of the
arguments put forward have addressed this issue.113 Particularly, concern
107
See Befort, supra note 33, at 1005–08 (discussing how the Court undermined the EEOC authority
in its earlier treatment of “disability” under the ADA).
108
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976)).
109
Id. At least one court has referenced the Court’s statements in interpreting the EEOC’s ADA
guidelines. See Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 202 n.12 (4th Cir. 1997).
110
Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1937, 1937 (2006). Much has been written on the Supreme Court’s refusal to defer to the EEOC
when deciding cases under the ADA. See id.; Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota
Sidestep: Dancing Around the EEOC’s “Disability” Regulations Under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 177, 177 (2004) (discussing how the Supreme Court has limited the applicability of the EEOC’s
disability guidelines in federal court); White, supra note 106, at 555–69 (reviewing the history of the
Court’s refusal to defer to the EEOC guidelines under the ADA). It has also been discussed whether the
EEOC was even given the authority to define “disability” under the ADA in the first place. Id. at 578–86.
111
Hickox, supra note 40, at 422–23. Concern has already been offered regarding judicial
interpretation and the lack of specificity in both the ADAAA and the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines. Id.
112
See supra Part II.E.
113
In considering the EEOC’s proposed regulations, the EEOC and DOJ Civil Rights Division held a
series of joint town hall listening sessions on the substance of the regulations. Regulations To Implement
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centers around whether the exception can (and should) be extended beyond
the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability under the ADA.114
Such consideration focuses less on the meaning of the exception and more
on its proper application within the statutory framework.
On its face, it would seem that the exception was meant to be
limited only to the “regarded as” prong. The relevant language of the statute
is as follows:
(1) Disability
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as
described in paragraph (3)) . . . .
(3) Regarded as having such an impairment
For purposes of paragraph (1)(C): . . .
(B) Paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to impairments that are
transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment
with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.115
The language immediately preceding the exception clearly states
that it is “for the purposes of paragraph (1)(C),” which is the paragraph
containing the “regarded as” prong.116 Further, the language of the
exception specifies paragraph (1)(C) as the portion of the statute the
the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg.
16,978, 16,979 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). Four joint sessions were
“held throughout the country to obtain direct input from the business/employer communities and the
disability and disability advocacy communities on the proposed regulations.” Public Town Hall Listening
Sessions on EEOC’s Proposed Regulations Under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg.
54,565, 54,565 (Oct. 22, 2009). While the scope of the exception was only brought up in one of four
listening sessions, the majority of public submissions to the EEOC have called for greater clarification on
the scope of the exception under the three prongs of disability. See Transcript of Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n and Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Division Town Hall Listening Session on the
ADAAA Proposed Regulations, in Chicago, Ill., at 15 (Nov. 17, 2009) available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetailD=EEOC-2009-0012-0674 (follow the “pdf” hyperlink)
[hereinafter “Chicago Listening Session”]; Docket Folder Summary for Comments Pursuant to The ADA
Amendments Act Notice of Proposed Rule Making, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;
dct=PS+PR;rpp=10;so=DESC;sb=postedDate;po=0;s=transitory+and+minor;D=EEOC-2009-0012
(lasted visited Sept. 12, 2011) (for a listing of submissions relating to the transitory and minor language).
114
See, e.g., COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC., supra note 64, at 3 (“[T]he bill does not explicitly
apply the ‘transitory and minor’ exception to the definition of disability in general. This means that some
transitory and minor impairments could be covered as actual disabilities.” (quoting Statement of
Administration Policy: H.R. 3195, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President (June 24,
2008))).
115
42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1), 12102(3)(B) (2006).
116
Id. § 12102(3).
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exception intends to cover.117 In this context, it is debatable whether any
ambiguity even exists regarding the scope of the exception. Thus, a judge
may not even consider alternative reasons for extending the exception
beyond the “regarded as” prong.118 However, some judges are more willing
to find ambiguity.119 Thus, the statutory language is not conclusive evidence
that the exception will be limited to the “regarded as” prong. While the
exception is found under the “regarded as” prong, there is nothing in the
definition indicating that application beyond the prong would be
inappropriate.120
Many of the arguments concerning the scope of the “regarded as”
prong were flushed out in response to the EEOC’s proposed regulations.121
The EEOC’s proposed rule, which was substantially similar to the final rule,
included a provision that expressly supported restricting the exception to the
“regarded as” prong.122 This provision was placed in the regulations
specifically in anticipation of confusion over the application of the
“transitory and minor” exception.123 However, this confusion has primarily
117

Id. § 12102(3)(B).
YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 4 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf
(“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is
complete.’” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992))); id. at 40 (“[W]e do
not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994))).
119
Id. at 40 (“When aid to the construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may
appear on ‘superficial examination.’” (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534,
543–44 (1940))).
120
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Nowhere in the definition of disability does the statute negate the fact
that the “transitory and minor” exception may be construed in light of the other prongs. Id.
121
See Docket Folder Summary for Comments Pursuant to The ADA Amendments Act Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=N+PS;rpp=10;so=ASC;sb=
organization;po=0;s=transitory+and+minor;D=EEOC-2009-0012 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (providing a
database of all submissions mentioning “transitory and minor”). Of the hundreds of public submissions
accepted by the EEOC, approximately thirty-three express issues with the “transitory and minor”
exception in some capacity. Id.
122
The EEOC’s final position states:
The six-month “transitory” part of the “transitory and minor” exception to
“regarded as” coverage in § 1630.15(f) does not apply to the definition of
“disability” under paragraphs (g)(1)(i) (the “actual disability” prong) or (g)(1)(ii)
(the “record of” prong) of this section. The effects of an impairment lasting or
expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the
meaning of this section.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2011). Meanwhile, the EEOC originally proposed the following language:
The “transitory and minor” exception in § 1630.2(l) of this part (the “regarded as”
prong of the definition of “disability”) does not establish a durational minimum for
the definition of “disability” under § 1630.2(g)(1) (actual disability) or §
1630.2(g)(2) (record of a disability). An impairment may substantially limit a
major life activity even if it lasts, or is expected to last, for fewer than six months.
Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as
Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431, 48,440 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
123
See Transcript of US Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n Meeting on the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-17-09/transcript.
cfm#notice. Just prior to passing the proposed rule, Christopher Kuczynski, Assistant Legal Counsel to
118
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come in the form of disputes between disabilities advocates and those
representing the employers who ultimately have to comply with the
amended statute.124 In this respect, the EEOC’s position limiting the scope
of the exception to the “regarded as” prong has met some resistance.125
Most who disagree with the regulation state that a durational
minimum should be extended to the first two prongs of the statute.126
Specifically, it was recommended that the EEOC alter the regulations to
expressly exclude all impairments that are transitory and minor from the
definition of disability.127 This argument, predominately made on the part of
employers, is offered in connection to the fact that traditionally under the
first two prongs, temporary, non-chronic conditions of short duration have
not been considered an impairment or disability in the first place.128 Since
all three prongs apply the same basic standards, it would save employers a
lot of confusion to apply a single criterion for eliminating coverage of shortterm disabilities under the ADA.129 Limiting the exception to the “regarded
the EEOC, stated that “in response to an anticipated confusion over the application of the transitory and
minor exception to the ‘regarded as’ definition of disability, the Proposed Rule includes a fifth rule of
construction which makes it clear that impairments that last for fewer than six months, may still be
substantially limiting.” Id.
124
Compare Nat’l Disabilities Rights Network, Comments on Regulations to Implement the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 12 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0565.1 (supporting the EEOC
regulation as the correct interpretation of the statute), with Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Comments on the
Proposed Regulations Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, 8
(Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; D=EEOC-2009-00120513.1 (advocating expansion of the exception to the entire definition). In general, public submissions
were evenly split between civil rights and disability groups and employer associations and industry
groups. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,979 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630).
125
See, e.g., U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Regulations
Implementing the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 27
(Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-00120561.1 (“The Commission’s language in this section creates an inference that impairments lasting longer
than six months will be considered disabilities under the first prong regardless of whether they are
substantially limiting.”); see also Chicago Listening Session, supra note 113, at 15 (concerning the
confusion created by applying the “transitory and minor” exception rigidly in the “regarded as” prong,
but not in the “actual” and “record of” prongs).
126
See, e.g., Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Comments on Proposed Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 4 (Nov. 23, 2009), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0560.1 (asking that the EEOC
delete the provision and include regulations specifying that “substantially limiting” precludes finding a
disability of six months or less a disability under the ADA); see also Ill. Credit Union League, Comments
on Proposed Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Amendments to the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0495.1 (arguing that the regulations should extend to all prongs
of the statute).
127
Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 124, at 8.
128
Int’l Franchise Ass’n, supra note 126, at 4; see also Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431,
48,448 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630); 154 Cong. Rec. H6074 (June 25,
2008) (statements of Rep. Nadler and Rep. Smith); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 30 (2008). This
corresponds with the Supreme Court’s traditional view that impairments must be of long duration to be
applicable to the first two prongs of disability. See supra Part II.B.
129
Int’l Franchise Ass’n, supra note 126, at 4.
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as” prong would not allow employers to analyze short-term disabilities
under the same criteria as the exception.130 This would force employers to
forgo the ultimate goal of avoiding unnecessary litigation and increased
compliance costs as a result of short-term disability claims under the
statute.131
However, others (mainly disabilities rights advocates) who support
the EEOC’s position argue that it is consistent with the express language of
the ADAAA and Congressional intent.132 Those who support the provision
indicate that it demonstrates Congress’s willingness to apply a rigid standard
when intended.133 They argue that limiting the exception to the “regarded
as” prong appropriately reflects Congress’s understanding that an
impairment that lasts six months or less may still be “substantially limiting”
to an individual, and is therefore covered under the statute.134 Further, it has
also been argued that the silence on any durational limit in the language of
the first and second prongs reinforces this assertion.135 In light of these
arguments, the EEOC itself has provided some legislative history supporting
its position.136
In this case, there is no real middle ground for interpreting the scope
of the exception under the ADA—either the exception applies throughout,
or it does not. Importantly, while the EEOC has provided guidance on this
issue, courts will not necessarily abide by it.137 Furthermore, any regulation
made by the EEOC must be consistent with the express language and
purpose of the statute.138 Thus, while application of the exception outside
the “regarded as” prong may provide greater clarity for employers, it may
not be allowable under the language of the statute. Ultimately, in deciding
130
Am. Pub. Transp. Ass’n, Comments on Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 2 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0486.1.
131
Id.; Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. and Indep. Elec. Contractors, Inc., Comments on
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as
Amended, 4 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-20090012-0487.1 (“The confusion and ambiguity the NPRM creates over this issue invites unnecessary
litigation, abuse of ADA protections and complicates disability determinations.”).
132
See, e.g., Nat’l Disabilities Rights Network, supra note 124, at 12; Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n,
Comments by the Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n on the U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunities Comm’n’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking – Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 13 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0586.2; see also Fram, supra note 46, at 212.
133
Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n., supra note 132, at 13.
134
Compare, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 125, at 27, with Nat’l Disabilities Rights
Network, supra note 124, at 12.
135
Nat’l Disabilities Rights Network, supra note 124, at 12.
136
See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 17,011 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified as amended at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630) (quoting Joint Hoyer-Sensenbrenner Statement); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app
sec.1630.2(j) (2011) (quoting the Senate Statement of Managers).
137
See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
138
5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(C) (2006). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court may hold
unlawful any administrative regulation made in excess of its statutory authority. Id.
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the scope of the exception, the language of the statute, Congressional intent,
and the purpose behind the statute control.
B. Coverage under the “Transitory and Minor” Exception:
Regardless of whether the “transitory and minor” exception is
included in the “actual” and “record of” prongs, the overall coverage of the
exception under the “regarded as” prong is equally important to the
inclusion of short-term disabilities under the ADA. Specifically, it must be
determined whether the exception covers only impairments that are both
transitory and minor, or impairments that are either transitory or minor.139
While this issue has received some notoriety, concern again derives less
from a lack of clarity in the text of the statute and more from tensions
between disabilities advocates and employers.140 In fact, arguments
primarily came in the form of disabilities groups arguing for more express
clarification that both requirements are necessary for the exception to
apply.141
The plain text of the amended ADA reads that the “regarded as”
prong of disability “shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and
minor.”142 On its face, the text seems unambiguous, indicating that the only
impairments covered under this exception are those that are both transitory
and minor. In fact, the majority of arguments supporting this position have
simply cited the use of “and” in the statutory language.143 Ordinarily, the
use of the term “and” in a list means that all of the items in that list are
required.144 Likewise, the term “or” is to be accepted for its disjunctive
connotation, and not interchangeable with “and.”145 Since the exception
applies to impairments that are transitory and minor, it implies that both
requirements must be met.
139

See supra Part II.E.
See, e.g., Transcript of US Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n and Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights
Div. Town Hall Listening Session on the ADAAA Proposed Regulations, in Philadelphia, Pa., at 17, 34–
35 (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-00120123 (follow the “pdf” hyperlink) [hereinafter “Philadelphia Listening Session”] (expressing that concern
over the coverage of the exception centers around the potential for over-inclusion under the ADA).
141
See, e.g., United Spinal Ass’n, Comments on Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, As Amended; Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 9
(Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-00120544.1 (association dedicated to improving the life of American’s with spinal cord injuries arguing for
both “transitory and minor”); Nat’l Disability Rights Network, supra note 124, at 11.
142
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2006); see supra note 115 and accompanying text.
143
Ky. Prot. and Advocacy, Comments on Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 11 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0549.1 (“The ‘regarded as’ prong of
the definition of disability does not include impairments that are transitory and minor.” (emphasis in
original)); Nat’l Disability Rights Network, supra note 124, at 11 (“The ‘regarded as’ prong of the
definition of disability does not include impairments that are transitory and minor.” (emphasis in
original)).
144
KIM, supra note 118, at 8 (citing, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1292
(D.N.M. 1996), aff’d, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997)).
145
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
140
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However, not everyone has interpreted the language in the same
manner.146
Instead, it has been argued that the exception would
appropriately exclude transitory impairments, minor impairments, and
impairments that have both features under the “regarded as” prong.147 Such
an interpretation reflects concern that to include either type of impairment
under the “regarded as” prong would be interpreting the ADA too
broadly.148 Concern again stems from contentions that limiting the
exception to only impairments that are both transitory and minor would
place an unnecessarily large burden on employers.149 Under the language of
the statute, it is arguable that if Congress intended to exclude only
impairments that are both transitory and minor, it should have expressly
stated so within the language of the statute (e.g. including the term “both,”
using the language “transitory, minor impairments”).150 Because Congress
failed to do so, interpretation of the exception is susceptible to the
alternative interpretation.
In light of judicial precedent, a court could be tempted to interpret
the statute in a way that would continue to keep a “disabling, but transitory,
physical or mental condition” from triggering the protections of the ADA.151
Indeed, coverage under this interpretation would have an extremely negative
impact on short-term disabilities under the ADA. Basically, separating
transitory and minor within the exception would eliminate all impairments
lasting six months or less from the “regarded as” prong of disability. Not all
courts will strictly apply canons of construction regarding the use of “and”
and “or.”152 In fact, the application of both “and” and “or” is said to be
context-dependent.153 Specifically, courts have altered the definition of
“and” and “or” where “a strict grammatical construction will frustrate
legislative intent.”154 In practice, many courts have construed the term
146

See Kevin M. Mosher, Hot Topic: New Amendments to the ADA - Effective January 1, 2009,
WESSELS SHERMAN, http://www.w-p.com/CM/Articles/New-Amendments-to-the-ADA.asp (last visited
Dec. 30, 2011) (interpreting the exception to exclude impairments that are transitory or minor); see also
House Passes ADA Expansion, PARKER POE, http://www.parkerpoe.com/news/house-passes-adaexpansion/ (last visited Dec. 30 2011) (newly passed legislation excludes transitory or minor
impairments).
147
Philadelphia Listening Session, supra note 140, at 17.
148
Id.
149
COUNCIL ON LAW IN HIGHER EDUC., supra note 64, at 3 (citing Letter from ACT, AAMC, et al.
to Senate leaders).
150
See KIM., supra note 118, at 15. This argument being that since Congress knows how to create a
clear exception, but chose the more ambiguous language, the interpretation could be made in favor of
excluding either transitory or minor impairments. Id. But see id. (“To say that Congress did not use the
clearest language, however, does not necessarily aid the court in determining what the less precise
language means in its statutory context.”)
151
Atkins v. USF Dugan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Befort, supra note 33, at 1028 (indicating that it is not inconceivable for hostile courts
to interpret the exception in the disjunctive).
152
KIM, supra note 118, at 8.
153
Id. at n.35 (citing Lawrence E. Filson, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESK REFERENCE § 21.10
(1992)).
154
United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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“and” as “or” when such an interpretation would best effectuate legislative
intent.155 Thus, theoretically it is possible to construe the “transitory and
minor” exception to actually mean transitory or minor. While the EEOC
has taken the position of limiting the exception to impairments that are both
transitory and minor, the possibility is still open to judicial interpretation to
the contrary.156 In the event that a court differs to the EEOC, the regulations
provide clear indication that impairments that are either transitory or minor
should be included.157 However, the EEOC does not provide concrete
examples to clear up situations where an injury is solely transitory or solely
minor.158 Thus, it seems that while the EEOC would require exclusion of
both transitory and minor conditions, it does little to indicate the standard
for deciding what impairments would fall under this criterion.
C. Defining Terms: “Transitory” and “Minor”
Of all the ambiguities in the “transitory and minor” exception, the
lack of an adequate definition for what disabilities might be considered
minor stands to be the most prohibitive to short-term disabilities. The
definition of “transitory” is clear from the language of the ADAAA, which
states that a transitory impairment is any impairment “with an actual or
expected duration of 6 months or less.”159 This language, which the EEOC
has incorporated into its guidelines, is unambiguous.160 On the other hand,
neither the EEOC, nor the language of the amended ADA, has defined what
the term “minor” means within the context of the “regarded as” prong.161
Since the exception seems to combine short-term disabilities with ones that
are minor, an adequate definition is essential for determining how short-term
disabilities are covered under the ADA.
The lack of any definition for “minor” within the ADAAA has been
acknowledged by both disability advocates and employers.162 However,
155
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Skipper, 115 F. 69, 72 (8th Cir. 1902); United States v. Cumbee, 84
F. Supp. 390, 391 (D. Minn. 1949); United States v. Mullendore, 30 F. Supp. 13, 15 (N.D. Okla. 1939)
(construing “and” as “or”); see also Moore, 613 F.2d at 1040 n.85 (construing “and” as “or”).
156
See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
157
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii) (2011).
158
See id. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.15(f) (merely providing instances of bipolar disorder and “minor
back injury” as examples). Even the examples in EEOC’s proposed rule do not adequately address this
issue, as each either completely fits the definition (being both transitory and minor) or completely misses
it (being long-term and major). Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431-01, 48,443 (proposed Sept. 23,
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630); see supra note 99 and accompanying text. This concern was
commonly expressed during the EEOC’s town hall listening sessions regarding its Proposed Rules. See,
e.g., Chicago Listening Session, supra note 113, at 25.
159
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4, § 3(3)(B), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
160
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.15(f), 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
161
See id. §§ 1630.15(f), 1630.2(j)(1)(ix), pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.15(f); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)
(2006).
162
Nat’l Retail Fed’n, Comments on Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of
the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 5–6 (Nov. 23, 2008), available at
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neither side has proposed a workable definition under which the statute may
operate.163 Considering the judiciary’s tendency to restrict coverage under
the ADA, leaving “minor” as an open-ended term could allow a court to
expand the coverage of the exception and exclude short-term disabilities
under the ADA.164 While this would be a benefit for employers, it may lead
to the same tensions between the judiciary and the legislature that
culminated in the ADAAA in the first place. Arguably, it is this issue that
stands to generate the most uncertainty and litigation.165
Prior to the ADAAA, the term “minor” has only been used by the
Supreme Court in the context of whether an impairment is substantially
limiting under the “actual” prong of disability.166 Particularly, the Court
held that the substantially limiting requirement precluded impairments that
interfered in a minor way with the performance of manual tasks, rejecting
that a “mere difference” in lifestyle caused by the impairment was
significant enough.167 However, such terminology is unhelpful within the
context of the “regarded as” prong because the substantially limiting
requirement no longer applies to that prong under the amended ADA.168
Furthermore, the Toyota case was one of the restrictive Court cases that the
ADAAA specifically intended to reject.169 Since the enactment of the
ADAAA, there has been no clear judicial ruling on the meaning of the term
within the context of the “transitory and minor” exception.
In the absence of judicial interpretation, courts often interpret
statutory language by considering the entire statute, other similar statutes,
and the purpose of each provision within it.170 However, even this approach
fails to offer guidance in defining a minor impairment. In adopting the
language of the “regarded as” prong in the ADAAA, Congress used
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0526.1; Transcript of US Equal
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n and Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Town Hall Listening Session on the
ADAAA Proposed Regulations, in Oakland, Cal., at 45 (Oct. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EEOC-2009-0012-0122 (offering concerns stated by a
representative of the epilepsy foundation).
163
See Docket Folder Summary for Comments Pursuant to The ADA Amendments Act Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=PS+PR;rpp=10;
so=DESC;sb=postedDate;po=0;s=transitory+and+minor;D=EEOC-2009-0012 (last visited Dec. 30,
2011). No definition has been proposed in any public submission to the EEOC. See generally id.
164
See supra Part II.B. Naturally, the more impairments are included as “minor” means a larger
number of impairments are not covered under the “regarded as” prong as a result of the “transitory and
minor” exception. Id.
165
Befort, supra note 33, at 1027.
166
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
167
Id. (citing Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999)).
168
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2006); see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
169
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
170
See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974); KIM, supra note 118, at 2 (“Statutory
construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (quoting United Sav. Ass’n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988))).
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language that was substantially similar to regulations implemented by the
DOJ and the Department of Transportation.171 Yet, the inclusion of the
“transitory and minor” exception under the ADAAA is unique to the
EEOC’s regulations.172 Thus, while these regulations are similar, they do
not mention “minor” under their respective definitions of “regarded as.”173
Furthermore, no other section within the amended ADA defines the term.174
Without guidance from the statute or the courts, it is equally
difficult to create a workable definition for interpreting the exception. The
Supreme Court has regularly held that in the absence of a statutory
definition, courts construe a term in accordance with its ordinary or natural
meaning as defined in a dictionary.175 “Minor” ordinarily means “inferior in
importance, size, or degree: comparatively unimportant.”176 Yet, this
definition of “minor” is equally unworkable because it essentially replaces
an imprecise term (minor) with another equally imprecise term (inferior).
Meanwhile, an alternative definition defines “minor” as “not serious or
involving risk to life.”177 This again fails to lead to a conclusive and
applicable definition of “minor,” because it merely limits the ambiguous
term “minor” to the equal ambiguity of “not serious.” Under both
definitions, the ordinary meaning of “minor” is one of comparative degree.
Furthermore, some impairments that may be considered serious enough to
meet the definition of disability under the “substantially limits” test may not
necessarily be considered serious or life threatening, including dyslexia and
learning disorders.178 Accordingly, it seems the term “minor” cannot be
defined in a way that makes the application of the “minor” requirement a
mechanical exercise.179

171
3 AMS. WITH DISAB.: PRACT. & COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 12A:11 (2010). Compare, e.g., 28
C.F.R. § 35.104(4) (2010) (defining “regarded as” under the DOJ’s Regulations), with ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4, § 3(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555 (defining “regarded as” under the
ADAAA).
172
Compare 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (2010); 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2010) (defining disability under
the DOJ and U.S. Department of Transportation to not include the “transitory and minor” exception),
with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011) (defining disability under the EEOC to include the “transitory and
minor” exception).
173
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104; 49 C.F.R. § 37.3.
174
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3553–54. The amended ADA is very
extensive; however, no section addresses the issue of how a minor impairment should be defined. Id.
175
KIM, supra note 118, at 6 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)); see also Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (using multiple dictionaries in interpreting the
meaning of “because of”).
176
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 742 (10th ed. 1993).
177
Id.
178
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(4)(iii), pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(j)(4).
179
The Supreme Court has run into similar problems in other cases. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing words such as “distinct and palpable” and “fairly” as words not susceptible
to a precise definition).
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III. SOLUTION
While the EEOC regulations regarding the scope of the “transitory
and minor” exception have not been formally adopted by courts, they
represent the correct position. Limiting the exception to the “regarded as”
prong is the most accurate interpretation of the statute considering its
structure, purpose, and Congressional intent. Additionally, the “transitory
and minor” exception should only apply to those injuries that are both
transitory and minor, allowing disabilities that are transitory and severe or
long-term and minor to be covered. Again, such an interpretation is
appropriate in light of Congressional intent and the statute’s structure and
purpose. Finally, the term “minor” should be defined giving consideration
to the statutory context of the “transitory and minor” exception, the
Congressional intent, and the purpose of the ADAAA to provide broad
coverage under the statute.
A. Keeping the “Transitory and Minor” Exception Exclusive to the
“Regarded As” Prong
Considering the factual arguments at hand, the “transitory and
minor” exception should be limited to the “regarded as” prong in accordance
to the EEOC regulations. This interpretation is correct because it best
corresponds to statutory structure, the purpose of the “regarded as” prong,
and Congressional intent.
i. Statutory Structure
In conducting statutory interpretation, the starting point is always
the language of the statute itself.180 In this case, the express language of the
statute provides the most compelling reason for restricting the “transitory
and minor” exception to the “regarded as” prong. Simply put, since the
exception is only found within the definition referenced within the
“regarded as” prong, it should be restricted solely to that prong.181
Generally, “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another . . . , it is [generally] presumed that Congress
act[ed] intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”182 Nowhere else in the statute, including the “actual” and
“record of” prongs, does the exception appear, and therefore the language
should strictly apply where it is written. Thus, the fact that Congress chose
to add a different, more specific, restriction to the “regarded as” prong
180

KIM, supra note 118, at 2 (citing United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
222 (1952)).
181
See supra Part III.A.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (2006).
182
KIM, supra note 118, at 14 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)).
Indeed Congress did act intentionally in adding the exception exclusively under the “regarded as” prong.
See infra Part III.A.iii.
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indicates that Congress intended it to operate specifically within that
prong.183 It is simply implausible that the lack of any express language
limiting the exception to the “regarded as” prong provides evidence that it
may apply to the other prongs. In fact, the current language provides greater
support for the inference that the exception was not to be used anywhere
outside the “regarded as” prong.
Exclusion of the “transitory and minor” exception from the first two
prongs is further supported by express provisions within the ADA that
dictate how the statute is to be construed. Under the ADA, the definition of
“disability” is to be “construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . .
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.”184 At least
one court has shown its willingness to accept the broad coverage of
disability intended under the ADAAA, indicating this provision as a clear
representation of Congressional intent.185 Accordingly, limiting the scope of
the exception would best comply with this instruction, as it would limit the
express exclusion of transitory and minor impairments to only one section of
the statute.
In addition to the statute’s text, courts often consider the history of
the legislative process to determine appropriate meaning.186 The first
version of the ADAAA, known as the Americans with Disabilities
Restoration Act did not contain the “transitory and minor” exception under
the “regarded as” prong.187 In fact, it was very different from the later
adopted version of the ADAAA in that it provided a virtually unlimited
class by eliminating the requirement of substantial limitation from the
definition of disability.188 As a result of heavy pressure from the business
community, legislators were forced to adopt a compromise definition that
limited its scope under the Act.189 The compromise bill contained both the
substantial limitation requirement for the first two prongs as well as the
“transitory and minor” exception for the “regarded as” prong.190

183
This corresponds with the additional argument that the ADA’s silence on a durational limitation
in the other prongs of disability indicates that the exception should not apply. See supra notes 133–34
and accompanying text.
184
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1(c), 1630.2(g) (2011) (reviewing the
legislative history supporting broad coverage).
185
Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2009).
186
KIM, supra note 118, at 42 (citing United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
222 (1952)).
187
See S. Res. 1881, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); H.R. Res. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
188
Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA Amendments Act,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1270 (2009).
189
Id. at 1271. For a strong critique on the open-ended definition of disability under the Restoration
Act see Andrew M. Grossman & James Sherk, The ADA Restoration Act: Defining Disability Down,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/
2008/07/The-ADA-Restoration-Act-Defining-Disability-Down.
190
Compare H.R. Res. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007), with H.R. Res. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008)
(enacted).
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From this initial inclusion of the “transitory and minor” exception in
H.R. 3195 and S. 3406, the exception has exclusively been contained within
the “regarded as” prong.191 At no point during its passage through the
House or the Senate was the exception contained in any other portion of the
ADAAA.192 Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that “[n]egative
implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the portions
of a statute treated differently . . . were being considered simultaneously
when the language raising the implication was inserted.”193 In this case, the
language of all three prongs must have been discussed simultaneously as
Congress amended the ADA’s definition of disability, because all three
prongs were amended by the ADAAA. This strongly supports an inference
that the varying language should be applied separately under each prong of
disability.
ii. Statutory Purpose
Restriction of the “transitory and minor” exception to the “regarded
as” prong is also appropriate in light of its purpose in the statutory
scheme.194 In fact, the role of the “regarded as” prong, as altered under the
ADAAA, is so unique and expansive that there has been a great amount of
scholarly writing on its scope and the Congressional intent behind it.195
Unlike the first two prongs of disability, the “regarded as” prong was meant
as a catch-all for people discriminated against solely on the basis of the
myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities.196 In passing the
original ADA, Congress intended that the mere fact that an individual was
discriminated against due to a perceived or actual impairment would be
sufficient to be covered under the prong.197 Such intention was exhibited
and reiterated by the House Committee on the Judiciary (“Judiciary
191

See H.R. 3195; see also S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).
Id.
193
KIM, supra note 118, at 14 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997)); see also Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
194
KIM, supra note 118, summary (“In analyzing a statute’s text, the Court is guided by the basic
principle that a statute should be read as a harmonious whole, with its separate parts being interpreted
within their broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory purpose. The various canons of
interpretation and presumptions as to substantive results are usually subordinated to interpretations that
further a clearly expressed congressional purpose.”).
195
See, e.g., Befort, supra note 33, at 1016–17; Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disabilities Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203,
272–73 (2010); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(l) (2011) (summarizing the legislative
history behind this expansive view).
196
See Policy Brief Series: Righting the Americans with Disabilities Act—No. 15, The Supreme
Court’s Decisions Discussing the “Regarded As” Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Definition of Disability, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, (May 21, 2003) http://www.ncd.gov/
publications/2003/May212003 (describing the original intentions of Congress in forming the “regarded
as” prong). The first two prongs serve the alternative purpose of ensuring that when a person actually
has a disability that is substantially limiting to a major life activity or a record of that disability the
employer accommodates it and does not discriminate against the person on that basis. See 42 U.S.C. §§
12102(1)–(3), 12112(a)–(b) (2006).
197
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 13 (2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 15 (2008).
192
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Committee”), both at the time of the original ADA and during the passage
of the ADAAA.198 The committee stated that if a person is disqualified due
to an actual or perceived condition, and the employer cannot articulate a
legitimate reason for the rejection, “a perceived concern about employment
of persons with disabilities could be inferred and the plaintiff would qualify
for coverage under the ‘regarded as’ test.”199 This interpretation was made
to indicate that the “‘regarded as’ prong was meant to express Congress’s
understanding that unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fear, or prejudice
about disabilities are often just as disabling as actual impairments.”200
This more expansive purpose indicates that it requires a more
restrictive exception—one that would not be appropriately applied under the
“actual” and “record of” prongs. Specifically, as a result of its distinct
purpose, the “regarded as” prong has two functional differences that oppose
expanding the “transitory and minor” exception to the remaining prongs.
First, the “regarded as” prong is intended to cover a broader category of
disabilities.201 Under the ADAAA, the “actual” and “record of” prongs of
disability are intended to cover disabilities that are substantially limiting to
the major life activities of the individuals who possess the disability.202
Meanwhile, the “regarded as” prong contains no such requirement.203
Instead, it merely requires the employer to not discriminate as a result of any
actual or perceived impairment.204 Thus, not only does the “regarded as”
prong lack the “substantially limiting” requirement, but it greatly expands
the type of impairments covered. As a result, inclusion of the “transitory
and minor” exception was an effort to compensate for this expansion in
definition.205 Further, the ease of which a claim may be brought under the
“regarded as” prong suggests that the prong requires a more concrete
exception to its coverage.
Second, while reasonable accommodations are required under the
“actual” and “record of” prongs of disability, the ADAAA makes it clear
that employers do not need to provide them to individuals falling solely
under the “regarded as” prong.206 While it could be argued that expanding
the exception into the “actual” and “record of” prongs would serve as a
198

H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 12–13 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30–31(1990)).
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30–31.
200
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 14; 154 CONG. REC. S8436
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (Statement of Managers).
201
See Barry, supra note 195, at 278–81 (arguing that the “regarded as” prong represents a
“universal” approach to nondiscrimination under the ADAAA).
202
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
203
Id. § 12102(3)(A).
204
Id. (emphasis added); Befort, supra note 33, at 1017–18.
205
Long, supra note 55, at 220; Befort, supra note 33, at 1017.
206
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-325, § 6a(1)(h), 112 Stat. 3553, 3557 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C § 12201(h)); 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (Supp. II 2009) (“A covered entity . . . need not
provide a reasonable accommodation . . . to an individual who meets the definition of disability in
Section 12102(1) of this title solely under subparagraph (C) of such section.” (emphasis added)).
199
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barrier against providing accommodations to those who do not need them, it
is not a significant enough contention to justify betraying the express
language of the statute. As the EEOC has pointed out, the rigidity of the
“transitory and minor” exception is unnecessary under these two prongs,
because not every disabled individual who requests accommodation will
automatically be entitled to one under the ADA.207 For instance, an
employer could deny an accommodation if the individual “do[es] not need
the accommodation requested, there is no reasonable accommodation that
can be provided absent undue hardship, or they would not be ‘qualified’ or
would pose a ‘direct threat to safety, even with an accommodation.’”208 In
this light, businesses are already provided with protection against
unnecessarily providing accommodations. It is arguable that restricting the
exception to the “regarded as” prong indicates the understanding that some
impairments may require accommodation even though they last less than six
months—an interpretation that was already acknowledged by the EEOC.209
iii. Congressional Intent
The legislative history of the ADAAA also supports the fact that
Congress intended to limit the “transitory and minor” exception to the
“regarded as” prong.210 According to the Senate Statement of Managers, the
reason the exception was included under the “regarded as” prong is because
“individuals seeking coverage under this prong need not meet the functional
limitation requirement contained in the first two prongs of the definition.”211
Meanwhile, both the Labor & Education Committee and Judiciary
Committee stated that the exception merely clarifies the fact that an
individual who is regarded as having an impairment does not need to meet
the functional limitation, or severity, requirement that is contained in the
first and second prongs of disability.212 Thus, it seems clear that Congress
207
Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431, 48,433 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630).
208
Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2011) (providing undue hardship as a potential defense).
209
Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,447; 29 C.F.R. pt 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(j)(1)(ix); see also
Transcript of US Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n Meeting on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION (June 17, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-17-09/transcript.cfm#notice (“[T]he
Proposed Rule includes a fifth rule of construction which makes it clear that impairments that last for
fewer than six months, may still be substantially limiting.”).
210
For a thorough analysis of the legislative history of the ADAAA, see Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin
Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 200–40
(2008). Many proponents of limiting the scope of the exception, including the EEOC, have cited some
aspect of the legislative history to support their assertion. See, e.g., Hickcox, supra note 40, at 455–57;
see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
211
154 CONG. REC. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008). Similar language was included by the House
Committee on the Judiciary and the Labor and Education Committee Reports. See H.R. REP. NO. 110730, pt. 1, at 15 (2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 14, 16 (2008).
212
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 14.
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added the exception to accommodate the fact that the “substantially
limiting” requirement did not apply under the “regarded as” prong. Because
the “substantially limiting” requirement already serves as the limiting test
for the first two prongs, nearly all of the relevant legislative history agrees
that “[a] similar exception for the first two prongs of the definition is
unnecessary.”213 Thus, the legislative history provides a strong indication
that Congress did not intend the exception to apply beyond the “regarded
as” prong.
However, while the legislative history supports limiting the scope of
the “transitory and minor” exception, not all judges will consider it when
interpreting a statute.214
In fact, the Judiciary Committee even
acknowledged the “expectation that courts will focus on the statutory text of
the legislation, not the language placed in committee reports, when
interpreting this legislation.”215 To make this point clear, in Sutton, the
Court interpreted the ADA looking only at the statute as a whole, finding
“no reason to consider the ADA’s legislative history.”216 Still, considering
the plain language of the statute and the purpose of the “regarded as” prong
within the statutory scheme, restricting the scope of the “transitory and
minor” exception to the “regarded as” prong remains the best alternative.
B. Both But Not Either—Exclusion of Transitory AND Minor Impairments
In considering the coverage of the “transitory and minor” exception,
the exception should be limited to impairments that are both transitory and
minor—not merely one or the other. As in the previous analysis, this
interpretation corresponds best with the statutory structure, the purpose of
the statute, and Congressional intent.
i. Statutory Structure
In conformity with the analysis above, the starting point of judicial
interpretation is the language of the statute.217 In this case, the plain
meaning of the statute indicates that the exception should only include
impairments that are both transitory and minor.218 It is unconvincing to
argue that Congress did not intend both adjectives to apply to the same
impairment when it used the conjunctive term “and.” While it is arguable
213
154 CONG. REC. S8436 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (Statement of Managers); H.R. REP. NO. 110730, pt. 1, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16. But see Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.,
supra note 131, at 4 (arguing that the fact that it was “unnecessary” means that the exception already
functionally applies within the first two prongs).
214
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997) (thoroughly stating the case against the use of legislative history).
215
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 30.
216
Id. at n.1 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
217
See KIM, supra note 118, at 2 (citing United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218, 222 (1952)).
218
See supra Part. II.B.
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that Congress could have been clearer, it is doubtful that anyone considered
the language of the statute insufficient. In fact, in light of the statutory text
alone, little resistance has been offered to interpreting the language of the
statute to require both criteria.219 Specifically, there was not a single public
submission to the EEOC arguing that the language of the statute should be
interpreted to mean that either transitory or minor conditions should be
included under the EEOC regulations interpreting the “transitory and minor”
exception.220
Meanwhile, the broad coverage required in construing the language
of the ADAAA further supports limiting the exclusion solely to disabilities
that are both transitory and minor.221 Excluding either transitory or minor
injuries would decrease the amount of disabilities covered under the
“regarded as” prong by increasing the amount of disabilities excluded.
Thus, it would be extremely difficult for a court to reconcile excluding
either transitory or minor impairments while at the same time adhering to
the statutory order to broadly construe the definition of disability “to the
maximum extent permitted.”222
ii. Statutory Purpose
The broad purpose of the “regarded as” prong also limits the
necessity of interpreting the exception to exclude a greater number of
impairments. As previously mentioned, the ultimate goal of the “regarded
as” prong is to ensure that even where an impairment is not substantially
limiting, it cannot become the sole basis for an employer’s action.223
Accordingly, including impairments that are “transitory but severe” or
“long-term but minor” would best serve the purpose of preventing an
employer from taking discriminatory action on account of such
impairments. This reduces the risk, for example, that an excruciating
impairment of short duration is not the sole cause for discrimination or
termination. Meanwhile, it is difficult to argue that a person who is fired
solely for having a cold for eight months should not have a claim under the
“regarded as” prong if they are able to accomplish their job requirements.
Further, interpreting the exception to require both terms would not
overburden employers. In fact, employers should easily be able to avoid
violating the “regarded as” prong by offering any other justifiable motive for

219
See Docket Folder Summary for Comments Pursuant to The ADA Amendments Act Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail; dct=PS+PR;rpp=10;
so=DESC;sb=postedDate;po=0;s=transitory+and+minor;D=EEOC-2009-0012 (last visited Dec. 30,
2011) (listing the submitted comments to the EEOC).
220
Id.
221
See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
222
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a) (2006).
223
See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
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taking action against the employee.224 This is especially true considering a
recent court holding stating that employees whose employers have mixed
motives for taking adverse job actions against them have no recourse under
the ADA.225 Further, while inclusion of either impairments (transitory or
minor) may allow for more lawsuits under the “regarded as” prong, each
complaint must still be justifiable. As the EEOC has indicated, an
individual whose impairment falls under the “regarded as” prong still needs
to be “qualified” for the job they hold or desire.226 Thus, the “regarded as”
prong does not give employees a blanket justification for suing their
employer. In fact, under the “regarded as” prong, an employer can hold
such a person to the same standards as the other workers.227 Meanwhile, an
employer may also defend against claims under the “regarded as” prong by
showing that a particular individual would pose a direct threat to others or
that their action was taken based on another federal law.228
Furthermore, because the “regarded as” prong does not require
accommodations for disabilities, there is little-to-no risk that unnecessary
costs will be spent on someone with solely minor or transitory illnesses
under the prong.229 Thus, while the “regarded as” prong provides for
expansive coverage under the ADA, it does not expand the amount of
accommodations that an employer is required to provide. As part of this
important compromise with the business community, accommodations
would only be provided under the first two prongs if the condition was
significant enough to qualify as “substantially limiting.”230
iii. Congressional Intent
The legislative history further supports interpreting the exception to
only include impairments that are transitory and minor. While nothing in
the legislative history is directly on point to how Congress intended the
language to be interpreted,231 it is possible to decipher some meaning from
224

29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1) (2011).
Cristin Schmitz, ADA Plaintiffs Must Prove Disability is Sole Cause of Adverse Action,
INSIDECOUNSEL, (May 2010), http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/May-2010/Pages/ADAPlaintiffs-Must-Prove-Disability-.aspx?k=robert+duffy.
226
Questions and Answers on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
regulations/ada_qa_final_rule.cfm (last visited Dec. 30, 2011); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec.
1630.2(l) (“Establishing that an individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ does not, by itself,
establish liability. Liability is established . . . only when an individual proves that a covered entity
discriminated on the basis of disability within the meaning of section 102 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
12112.”).
227
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As long as the employer refrains from discriminating against the
employee on the basis of disability, the provisions of the ADA do not restrain the employer’s actions. Id.
228
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.15(b)(2), 1630.15(e), 1630.15(g).
229
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
230
See Befort, supra note 33, at 1017; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1), 12102(3)(b).
231
See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1 (2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2 (2008); see generally 154
CONG. REC. H6058–82 (daily ed. June 25, 2008).
225
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House Committee Reports and from the Congressional Record.232 For
instance, in the Joint Statement of Representatives Hoyer and Sensenbrenner
(the original sponsors of the ADAAA), the representatives referred to the
exception as requiring impairments to be “both transitory and minor.”233
Meanwhile, both the Judiciary Committee and Education & Labor
Committee presented the exception in terms of a single impairment that was
both transitory and minor.234 In its section-by-section analysis of the later
adopted version of the ADAAA, the Judiciary Committee stated that the
“regarded as” prong was not available for “a transitory and minor
impairment.”235 Similarly, the Education & Labor Committee stated that an
impairment would fall under the “regarded as” prong “as long as an
individual’s impairment is not transitory and minor.”236 All of these
statements indicate the intention that only impairments that are both
transitory and minor should be included.237 While it is arguable that the
committees and representatives did not actually intend for their language to
be interpreted with such rigor, nothing in the legislative history even
suggests that transitory or minor impairments should individually be
included within the exception.238
Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that Congress
considered the needs of the business community when it determined the
language of the exception.239 In fact, it specifically states that the exception
was included to respond to the business community’s concerns regarding
potential abuse of the ADA and the resulting misapplication of resources on
individuals with minor ailments lasting only a short period of time.240 Such
exceptions were intended to prevent litigation over minor illnesses and
232
154 CONG. REC. H6067 (joint statement of Rep. Hoyer and Rep. Sensenbrenner); H.R. REP. NO.
110-730, pt. 1, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16.
233
154 CONG. REC. H6067 (joint statement of Rep. Hoyer and Rep. Sensenbrenner). Similar
language was used in the Senate Statement of the Managers. 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11,
2008) (Statement of Managers accompanying the Senate’s adopted version of the Act).
234
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14 (stating that the exception is relevant where “the impairment
that an individual is regarded as having is a transitory and minor impairment[]” (emphasis added)); H.R.
REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2., at 18 (including the same language). Both of these committees were referred
the original version of ADAAA by Congress with the express task of restoring the original intent of the
ADA, and recommended it to the House in its now adopted form. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 1;
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 1.
235
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14 (emphasis added).
236
Id.
237
See also Fram, supra note 46, at 219 (citing the Senate Statement of Managers as further
evidence of the requirement that an impairment be both transitory and minor).
238
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1; see generally H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2; see
generally 110 CONG. REC. H6058-82 (daily ed. June 25, 2008). A court may be reluctant to place
significant weight on the “excerpts” of legislative history unless they are directly related to giving
meaning to an enacted statute and the interpretation is one the text can actually bear. KIM, supra note
118, at 43, n.245 (citing Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495,
501(1988)).
239
Anderson, supra note 188, at 1271.
240
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16; 154 CONG. REC. S8436
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (Statement of Managers accompanying the Senate’s adopted version of the
Act).
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injuries that were never meant to be covered by the ADA.241 Consequently,
it is apparent that both Congress and businesses analyzed the language in
light of these considerations and concluded that it did not need to be clearer.
C. The Definition of “Minor”:
Finally, under the “transitory and minor” exception, courts should
construe the term “minor” very narrowly, applying it to impairments that are
synonymous to a hangnail, common cold, sprained joint, or stomach ache.
This interpretation is appropriate because it best corresponds with the rules
of statutory structure, Congressional intent, and the purpose of the exception
under the “regarded as” prong.
i. Statutory Structure
General rules of statutory construction support a narrow
interpretation of “minor” under the exception. First, the amended ADA
specifically requires the definition of disability be construed in favor of
broad coverage.242 This is consistent with the rule of statutory interpretation
requiring that terms in remedial statutes be construed to broadly effectuate
their purpose.243 “[T]he ADA is a remedial statute [because its purpose is]
to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society.”244
Thus, the term “minor” should be construed to broadly effectuate this
purpose.245 This would mean interpreting “minor” narrowly to include the
maximum amount of disabilities permissible under the statute. Second, the
language of exemptions to any statute, known as provisos, is to be narrowly
and strictly construed.246 Therefore, as an exception to the “regarded as”
prong, little leeway should be afforded to the scope of what impairments are
considered “minor.” Moreover, due to the greater compromise found in the
ADAAA and Congress’s clear message that courts misinterpreted the
statute, it is argued that courts will be less willing to narrow coverage under
the ADA.247
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154 CONG. REC. H6067 (joint statement of Rep. Hoyer and Rep. Sensenbrenner).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. III 2009); see also supra note 184 and accompanying text.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.1(c) (2011); see, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967); see also Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 622 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
244
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
245
See id.; see also Lincoln Cercpac v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (“The ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial purpose.”).
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E.g., Coral Cadillac, Inc. v. Stephens, 867 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is also a
basic tenet of statutory construction that exceptions or provisos should be narrowly and strictly
construed.”); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(l).
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Anderson, supra note 188, at 1312–24.
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ii. Statutory Purpose
The purpose of the “regarded as” prong further supports a narrow
construction of “minor.” Again, the “regarded as” prong was primarily
included as a catch-all to ensure that any individual with a disability is not
discriminated against solely due to their disability.248 Accordingly, the
standard was never intended to be a difficult one to meet.249 In reality,
limiting the exception (and accordingly, the interpretation of “minor”) will
simply allow individuals with any type of impairment to overcome the
initial obstacle of establishing a valid claim under the ADA.
Further, while a narrow interpretation of “minor” increases the
potential claims under the ADA, it would not place an incredible burden on
employers. As emphasized above, businesses will still be protected by the
fact that employees falling solely under the “regarded as” prong must still be
qualified for the job they hold or desire.250 This, coupled with the fact that
courts may be willing to protect employers who have mixed motives for
taking adverse actions from recourse under the ADA, provides a standard
that employers should easily be able to meet.251
Further still, employers will not have to worry about providing
accommodations for employees with “minor” injuries under the “regarded
as” prong.252 In fact, since reasonable accommodations are no longer
required under the “regarded as” prong, arguably judges and employers no
longer need to worry about giving an impaired, but not disabled, person a
“windfall [due to an] employer’s erroneous perception of disability, when
other impaired but not disabled people are not entitled to
accommodation.”253
iii. Congressional Intent
The narrow interpretation of the term “minor” is directly supported
by the legislative history. In fact, many have provided the legislative history
of the ADAAA to demonstrate that Congress intended the “transitory and
minor” exception to be extremely limited.254 Reports by both the Judiciary
Committee and the Education & Labor Committee on the now adopted
version of the ADAAA stated that the exception was only intended for
claims lying at the lowest end of the spectrum of severity.255 As the
Judiciary Report noted, all revisions to coverage under the ADA were made
248

See supra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
See id.; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(l).
See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
252
See supra note, 207–08 and accompanying text.
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Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Kaplan v. City of N.
Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Anderson, supra note 188, at 1297–98.
254
See, e.g., Barry supra note 195, at 274.
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H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15 (2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16 (2008).
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to restore its original vision, citing the legislative history of the original act
where both the Education & Labor Committee and Senate committees
reported that “persons with minor, trivial impairments such as a simple
infected finger are not impaired in a major life activity.”256 This emphasis
on exclusion of only the most minor and trivial impairments was reiterated
on the House floor by several representatives.257
In accordance with the rule of statutory interpretation, both the
Judiciary Committee and Labor & Education Committee stated that as an
exception to the generally broad coverage of the “regarded as” prong, the
limitation on coverage should be construed narrowly.258 Furthermore, both
committees indicated that the exception was intended to be considered in
light of the business community’s concerns regarding potential abuse of the
ADA and the resulting misapplication of resources on individuals with
minor ailments lasting only a short period of time.259 Accordingly, the
legislative history indicates that the definition of “minor” was intended to be
very exacting, including only very trivial impairments.
The legislative history is also helpful in supplying specific examples
of ailments that should be considered “minor.” Both the Judiciary
Committee and Labor & Education Committee stated that absent the
“transitory and minor” exception, the “regarded as” prong would have
“covered individuals who are regarded as having common ailments like the
cold or flu.”260 In addition, ailments such as stomach aches, mild seasonal
allergies, and even hangnails were addressed on the House floor as ailments
expected to be excluded under the exception.261 These ailments were
reiterated by the Judiciary Committee, emphasizing that if Congress’s
intended interpretation were inappropriately broadened by the judiciary,
there would be an “obligation to accommodate people with stomach aches, a
common cold, mild seasonal allergies, or even a hangnail.”262 Thus, in light
of the legislative history, ailments that would likely be considered minor
would be the common cold or flu, stomach ache, mild allergies, infected
fingers, or a hangnail. These ailments are certainly in line with the narrow
interpretation intended for the exception.

256
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 30 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, pt. 1, at 23
(1989)); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)).
257
154 CONG. REC. H6074 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statements by Rep. Nadler and Rep. Smith).
258
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16; see also 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. sec.1630.2(l) (2011).
259
Id. This contention was reiterated before the Senate in the Statement of Managers. See 154
CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (Statement of Managers accompanying the Senate’s
adopted version of the Act).
260
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18. Exclusion of such
illnesses was reiterated on the House floor following the passage of the House version of the bill. 154
CONG. REC. H6067 (joint statement of Rep. Hoyer and Rep. Sensenbrenner).
261
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Id.
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All of the preceding sources indicate that the “transitory and minor”
exception should be interpreted narrowly and strictly applied. Thus, in
construing the definition of “minor,” the term must be applied in its
narrowest meaning. While “minor” is not a word that is constrained to a
single definition, considering the purpose of the statute and Congressional
intent, only those impairments synonymous to a hangnail, common cold,
sprained joint, or stomach ache should be included under its meaning.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has sought to iron out some of the more
controversial ambiguities regarding short-term disabilities under the newly
amended ADA. Overwhelmingly, the ADAAA championed broader
coverage of disabilities under the ADA and accordingly most of the more
accurate interpretations have come out in favor of such. In sum, this
Comment has advocated: (1) limiting the “transitory and minor” exception
to the “regarded as” prong; (2) limiting coverage of the exception to those
injuries that are both transitory and minor; and (3) defining the term “minor”
under a narrow definition that includes only impairments synonymous with
a hangnail, common cold, sprained joint, or stomach ache under its meaning.
All of these positions are strongly supported by the rules of statutory
structure, the purpose of the statute, and Congressional intent, and also have
justifiably been adopted by the EEOC in some degree.
Generally, analysis of the ADA’s language has pit disability
activists against employers. As each anticipates adjustments they will need
to make under the amended statute. However, narrowing the scope and
coverage of the “transitory and minor” exception does not necessarily mean
overburdening employers. The ADA still dictates that a person will not
have an impairment adequate enough for coverage under the first two
prongs of disability unless their impairment substantially limits their ability
to perform a major life activity compared to the general population.263 Thus,
impairments that are transitory and minor might naturally fail to succeed
under these two prongs. Further, employers are offered a number of
defenses against ADA claims and do not have to accommodate employees
under the “regarded as” prong.264 Practically speaking, it is possible for one
to have an ailment that is excruciating but transitory, or a minor impairment
that is long-lasting. The ADA simply asks that employers refrain from
taking adverse action against an individual because of such impairments.
In light of all of the technical arguments that can be made in relation
to the statute, it is important to remember the most general principle behind
the ADAAA is to broaden coverage of Americans with disabilities under the
263
264

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B) (2006).
See supra notes 206, 224–28 and accompanying text.
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Act. While short-term disabilities were largely excluded under the original
ADA, the ADAAA brought new hope that such disabilities will receive
wider coverage in the future. This is not to say that all short-term
disabilities are now included under the statute, but merely the ones that are
unnecessarily used by employers as a basis for discrimination. Indeed, “the
question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the
ADA should not demand extensive analysis[.]”265 Instead, impairment
should simply be interpreted to extend the common protection afforded to
similar civil rights in today’s society—a protection that courts were
historically unwilling to afford and Congress specifically made a point to
reinstate.

265
Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
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